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Abstract
The question of how people recognize themselves and separate themselves from the environment and others has long
intrigued philosophers and scientists. Recent findings have linked regions of the ‘default brain’ or ‘intrinsic system’ to self-
related processing. We used a paradigm in which subjects had to rely on subtle sensory-motor synchronization differences
to determine whether a viewed movement belonged to them or to another person, while stimuli and task demands
associated with the ‘‘responded self’’ and ‘‘responded other’’ conditions were precisely matched. Self recognition was
associated with enhanced brain activity in several ROIs of the intrinsic system, whereas no differences emerged within the
extrinsic system. This self-related effect was found even in cases where the sensory-motor aspects were precisely matched.
Control conditions ruled out task difficulty as the source of the differential self-related effects. The findings shed light on the
neural systems underlying bodily self recognition.
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Introduction
The division between the self and the external environment is a
fundamental aspect of our psychological life [1,2]. The question of
the nature and status of self-related processing has been the focus
of heated debate in the history of philosophy and psychology [1,3–
5] and more recently in brain research [6–10]. The multi-faceted
nature of the concept of self poses a major challenge in the search
for the neural correlates of self-related processing. Basic theoretical
distinctions have been developed by philosophers and further
refined by recent research. The physical self (James,1890) or
‘proto-self’ [11,12] refers to a preconscious representation of the
self in the sensory and motor domains. The mental self [1] or
‘minimal self’ [13,14] refers to ‘‘a consciousness of oneself as an
immediate subject of experience, unextended in time’’ [15]. The
‘‘spiritual’’ [1], ‘‘autobiographical’’ [11] or ‘‘narrative’’ [15] self
extends the representation of the self in time. Further functionally
based distinctions have burgeoned in the recent literature and
include the facial self [16–19], emotional self [20,21], verbal self
[22], spatial self [23,24] and social self [25,26].
Processing of the diverse aspects of the self draws on information
derived from various sensory and cognitive processes associated
with separate brain networks. Yet, phenomenologically, the sense
of self is unified [15] and the brain integrates the different aspects
of the self into a single cohesive concept. A fundamental question is
whether the sense of self is represented in cortical regions that
integrate and read-out ‘‘lower level’’ sensory-motor information,
or if it is represented in a specialized, unitary system. The current
literature points to a convergence of self- related activity in the
cortical midline regions, specifically the prefrontal dorsal and
ventral medial cortex as well as the posterior medial and
precuneus regions [10 for a review], which was observed using
different operationalizations of the self [6,9,27,28].
Recent fMRI research has revealed a new fundamental cortical
subdivision into two global systems. One system, which we have
called the ‘‘extrinsic system’’, [29] encompasses all the sensory-
motor areas engaged with processing and acting on information
derived from the outside environment. This system shows high
levels of inter- and intra-subject correlation in response to natural
stimuli.[29,30]. It includes the occipital, parietal and temporal
primary and secondary sensory regions, as well as the frontal
motor and premotor regions. The second system, which we have
called the ‘‘intrinsic system’’ [29,31], shows task-related deactiva-
tions, that is, activity reduction during tasks involving processing of
external stimuli [32,33], such that its activity is highly antic-
orrelated with that of the extrinsic system. The intrinsic system
substantially overlaps the system described by Raichle and
colleagues as the default mode network [6,34,35]. It includes the
prefrontal medial and superior frontal cortex, the posterior medial
part of the cingulate gyrus and precuneus, and the bilateral
inferior parietal cortex. Whereas the extrinsic system has been
extensively investigated and the stimulus types processed by its
different regions are fairly well characterized, the functional
organization of the intrinsic system is much less understood. To
date, it has been only broadly associated with processing of
information derived from the organism itself [6,33]. Accordingly, a
growing body of data has implicated this system in various
‘‘inward’’-oriented tasks, such as mental-state attribution [36],
perspective taking [37], daydreaming [38], emotional processing
[39] and theory of mind [14].
It is noteworthy that selective activation of regions of the intrinsic
system has been reported in recent research specifically aimed at
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describing the neural correlates of self-related processing ( [9] for a
review). In these studies, the ‘‘self’’ condition was operationalized
using diverse self-referential activities such as reflection on personality
traits and physical appearance of self vs. other [27], retrieval of
personality trait adjectives [40], evaluation of personality traits as self
descriptive [41], first-person perspective taking [24], introspection
[8], voluntary decision [42], and facial self recognition [19,36].
However, these studies typically included differences in stimulus
or task conditions that were confounded with the self vs. other
manipulation. Some [6,8] contrasted an emotional valence task
(self condition) with a perceptual decision task (non-self condition).
Other studies required subjects to imagine different mental
perspectives [43,44], or to make judgements about character
traits of self vs. other people [27]; [45]. Others employed the same
task in the ‘‘self’’ and ‘‘other’’ conditions but used different stimuli
in the two conditions. For instance, in self-face recognition tasks,
pictures of self were contrasted with pictures of either unfamiliar
[19] or famous [36] people. Similar limitations apply to studies
using point-of-view tasks [24,37].
In the current study we explored judgments on a fundamental
and concrete level of self processing often termed the ‘minimal self’
[13]. The minimal self includes embodiment or body-ownership
(the sense of our consciousness residing in a body) and agency (the
sensation of willed control over the movements of that body),
which under normal conditions are in complete accord, such that
‘‘my body does what I will it to do’’. An important advantage of
this operationalization of the self is that it refers to a primary level
of self schema that is less likely to be confounded with individual or
cultural differences [46]. Accordingly, the formation of the sense of
agency and embodiment precedes developmentally the more
abstract levels of self [15,47]. In the current experiment we
manipulated the sense-of-embodiment aspect of the minimal self
by requiring the subjects to attribute viewed hand movements to
themselves or to another person and tested the extent to which
agency affected performance on this discrimination.
We employed an experimental paradigm adapted from [48] and
depicted in Figures 1 & 2. This paradigm has the advantage that
self-recognition can be manipulated while all external sensory-
motor aspects are tightly matched. Subjects viewed the motion of a
gloved hand on a screen, either their own hand in a live movie
(‘‘View Self’’) or the same hand but in a pre-recorded movie (as
subjects were led to believe that they would be viewing another
Figure 1. 2x2 factorial design of the experiment. Left panels: ‘‘View Self’’ condition, in which the subjects saw their own right hands in a live
movie, that is, a movement than was perfectly synchronized with their own. Right panels: ‘‘View Other’’ condition, in which the subjects saw the same
hands but in a pre-recorded movie, such that there were small timing differences between the viewed and the executed movements. Upper panels:
‘‘Active’’ condition, in which the lever that lifted the subjects’ right hands was pressed by the subjects’ left hands. Lower panels: ‘‘Passive’’ condition, in
which the lever was pressed by the experimenter. The subjects’ right hands were gloved in order to prevent any attempt to distinguish between the
view-self and view-other conditions based on morphological differences.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007527.g001
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person’s hand and the effectiveness of this manipulation was
validated in post experimental debriefing we have termed this as
‘‘View Other’’). As the movement was highly constrained, the two
conditions were precisely matched in terms of the sensory stimuli
and motor responses, and differed only in subtle timing variations
between the viewed and the executed movement. Based on such
differences, subjects had to report whether the viewed hand was
their own or someone else’s. In addition, the hand’s motion was
induced either by the subject’s other hand (‘‘Active motion’’) or by
the experimenter (‘‘Passive motion’’) using a lever. Importantly, in
the present design the stimuli and task demands associated with
the ‘‘responded self’’ and ‘‘responded other’’ conditions were
closely matched. We expected to observe higher levels of brain
activity within the intrinsic system when subjects judged the
viewed hand to be their own (‘‘responded self’’ condition) as
opposed to someone else’s (‘‘responded other’’ condition). Our
results confirm this prediction. Control analyses ruled out the
possibility that factors other than the self vs. other distinction,
namely arousal, task difficulty or synchronicity between the viewed
and executed movement, might account for the observed
differences. The present data provide the first evidence of
enhanced activation of the human intrinsic system in self vs. other
conditions that entail identical stimuli and response parameters.
Methods
Participants
Eleven healthy subjects (ages 22–32, right-handed as measured
by a laterality quotient .50 on the Edinburgh handedness
inventory[49]) participated in the experiment. Subjects had
normal or corrected to-normal vision. The Tel-Aviv Sourasky
Medical Center approved the experiment and issued an according
Helsinki agreement. All subjects gave written informed consent for
both the experiment and the imaging procedure. Four additional
subjects were removed from the analysis due to movement
artifacts.
Experimental Paradigm
The movement was a passive elevation of the subject’s right
index finger by a lever (angle 135u), which allowed separating the
action from its somatic effect. The lever was pressed either by the
subject’s own left hand (‘Active’ condition), or by the experimenter
(‘Passive’ condition). Pressing the lever was prompted by an
auditory cue delivered via headphones. During the movement,
subjects viewed video movies of their own right hand either live
(‘‘view self’’, henceforth ‘‘VS’’ condition) or pre-recorded during
the training session (‘‘view other’’, henceforth ‘‘VO’’ condition)
(see Figure. 2). The movies were relayed by an LCD projector
(Epson MP 7200) onto a tangent screen positioned in front of the
subjects’ foreheads and viewed through a tilted mirror placed
above their heads. In all conditions only the right hand and right
side of lever were visible on the screen. Video images were
displayed by means of custom-built software.
Subjects lay prone in the fMRI scanner at Tel-Aviv Sourasky
Medical Center, with a pillow placed on their chests and a wooden
board over the abdomen area. The pillow served to occlude direct
view of their hands. Importantly, the subjects wore dark woollen
gloves so as to preclude the possibility that any physical cues might
Figure 2. Combined blocked and event-related experimental paradigm. A. Blocked design. Red epochs represent the active blocks and
green epochs represent the passive blocks. The blue bars represent the instructions given before each block triplet of the same type. B. Event-related
design within each block. Light blue bars represent view-self events and yellow bars represent view-other events (motion trials). Gray bars represent
fixation events. C. Sequence of events making up motion trials. Subjects viewed a hand at rest for 500 ms. Then, following an auditory cue, the lever
pressing sequence started and the moving hand was viewed for 1,500 ms. A 1,000-ms interval followed during which the screen went blank and
subjects responded whether the viewed hand had been their own or someone else’s hand.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007527.g002
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promote self-hand recognition. The fingers of their right hands
were fixed to the table using pre-placed Velcro strips, except for
the index finger which was fixed to one end of the lever. Their left
hands were placed on the table with the left index finger placed on
the other end of the lever.
Subjects were told that the experiment tested self-recognition
ability based on motion. While the experimenter explained the
task, the subjects viewed a sample video that depicted the hand of
another subject. This procedure was aimed at strengthening the
subjects’ belief that the View Other condition indeed consisted of
videos of other people’s hands. Then the subjects completed a
practice block (9 active trials and 9 passive trials), during which 16
video clips of each subject’s movement were recorded. Of these,
one representative active and one representative passive clips were
selected by the experimenter for use in the experiment as the
stimuli of the ‘view other’ condition.
The experiment followed the practice trials. After they
completed the experiment the subjects were asked to fill out a
personal questionnaire and the Edinburgh handedness inventory
[49]. The subjects were interviewed in order to assess the
perceived difficulty of the experiment in the two conditions, the
effectiveness of the deception procedure designed to have them
believe that their own pre-recorded hand belonged to someone
else, and their confidence regarding their responses and to uncover
any special strategy they might have used in selecting their
responses. The subjects were then fully debriefed and thanked for
their participation.
Experimental Design
Conditions of movement authorship (Active/Passive) were run
in sequences of three blocks per condition, with condition order
counterbalanced between subjects. Conditions of identity (VS/
VO) were pseudo-randomly mixed within blocks, together with a
‘‘fixation’’ condition, consisting of the presentation of a fixation
sign in the center of an otherwise blank screen. The latter
condition was added so as to allow event-related deconvolution.
There were 12 blocks altogether, 6 for the active condition and
6 for the passive condition. Each block contained 18 trials (6 per
condition – VS/VO/fixation). Each trial lasted 3000 msec. In the
VS and VO conditions, a still image of the hand appeared for
500 ms. Then a 100-ms audio cue was onset at the same time as a
1500-ms movie of the hand, during which subjects had to decide
whether they were viewing their own hands or someone else’s. On
each trial, subjects responded by moving one of their feet, one foot
if they judged that the hand they viewed was their own and the
other foot if they judged that the hand was someone else’s.
Response-to-foot assignment was counterbalanced between sub-
jects. A 1000-ms response interval followed during which the
screen went blank. In the fixation condition, the fixation display
was presented for 3000 ms.
There were 216 trials in total, such that the experimental blocks
lasted 10 min 48 sec. There was a short break of either 8 or 10 sec
after each block, with an additional 5-sec break every 3 blocks,
during which the task was changed to a different condition of
movement authorship. All trials were monitored online by an
experimenter who inspected both the subject’s movement and the
movement shown on the screen to ensure that the timing of the
subject’s response and the viewed action were synchronized. Any
trials judged by the experimenter to be deviant were excluded
from the analysis (4% of all trials).
Imaging Procedure
Subjects were scanned on a 3 Tesla Signa Horizon LX 8.25 GE
scanner equipped with a standard birdcage head coil. Blood
oxygen level dependent (BOLD) contrast was obtained with
gradient echo echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence (TR, 1000; TE,
30; flip angle, 90u; field of view, 24624 cm2; matrix size, 80680).
The scanned volume included 16 nearly axial slices of 6-mm
thickness and 1-mm gap, so as to cover the entire cortical surface
of the brain. T1-weighted high-resolution (1.161.1 mm) anatom-
ical images and a whole-brain spoiled gradient (SPGR) sequences
were acquired for each subject to allow accurate cortical
segmentation and reconstruction, and volume-based statistical
analysis. The cortical surface was reconstructed from the three-
dimensional SPGR scan and was then unfolded and flattened. The
obtained activation maps were superimposed on the unfolded and
inflated cortices.
Data Analysis
fMRI data were analyzed with the ‘‘BrainVoyager’’ software
package (Brain Innovation, Masstricht, Netherlands) and with
complementary in-house software. The cortical surface in a
Talairach coordinate system [50] was reconstructed from the
3D-spoiled gradient echo scan for each subject. The obtained
activation maps were superimposed on the unfolded cortex.
Preprocessing of functional scans included 3D motion correction
and filtering out of low frequencies up to twelve cycles per
experiment (slow drift). Statistical mapping was based on the
General Linear Model [51]. Our analysis consisted of a multiple
regression with a regressor for each condition in the experiment
and assuming a hemodynamic lag of 5–6 s. Predictors were
convolved with a standard two-gamma HRF waveform. The data
was spatially smoothed with a Gaussian filter of full width of half
maximum value of 4 mm.
The analysis was performed independently for the time course
of each individual voxel.
The multi-subject maps were obtained using the screening for
partial conjunction analysis method suggested in Heller [52] to
create informative group maps. In order to obtain activation maps
showing the voxels activated by at least u subjects while controlling
for the FDR, the following analysis was done. First, we combined
the p-values per voxel using equation (6)
Pv
u=n~1{w
P
i~1
n{uz1
zv ið Þﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
n{uz1
p
 !
and (7) [52].
Pv
u=n~p x22(n{uz1)§{2
Xn
i~u
log p ið Þv
 !
Second, we applied the BH procedure on the resulting
combined p-value map. This analysis was repeated for all values
of u = 1,…,n, and the n activation maps were superimposed on the
same display. The multi-subject functional maps were projected on
an inflated or unfolded Talairach normalized brain.
Definitions of ROIs
ROIs were defined both functionally and anatomically based on
the regions showing negative activity on the all tasks-versus-fixation
contrast. This was done on a subject-by-subject basis with a
minimum p value of 0.01, corrected. Each ROI was defined with
the constraint that it contained at least 200 contiguous voxels and
overlapped the regions of the intrinsic system as discussed in [29].
Six ROIs were selected for analysis: medial prefrontal cortex
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(MPFC), right and left superior and prefrontal cortex (RSFC &
LSFC), precuneus (PCUN) and right and left posterior parietal
cortex (RIPC & LIPC). Talairach coordinates were determined for
the center of each ROI. Time courses for each of the ROIs were
extracted for each subject and then averaged. Peak activations were
averaged for each condition and compared using Student’s t tests.
Extrinsic ROIs were selected in a similar manner using the
regions showing strongest positive activations in the all task vs.
baseline condition. These included bilateral lateral occipital
cortex, bilateral inferior occipital cortex, dorsal medial prefrontal
cortex, the bilateral post central sulcus, bilateral superior
intraparietal sulcus, left post central gyrus and the superior part
of the right lateral sulcus.
Results
Behavioral results
Behavioral self-recognition performance was assessed based on
Signal Detection Theory [53]. Mean proportions of Hits (self hand
correctly attributed to self), Misses (self hand incorrectly attributed
to other), Correct Rejections (other’s hand correctly attributed to
other) and False alarms (other’s hand incorrectly attributed to self)
are presented separately for the ‘‘Active’’ and ‘‘Passive’’ conditions
in Figure 3. Our findings are consistent with the results reported in
the original experiment by [48] although overall accuracy was
somewhat lower, probably due to increased difficulty in perform-
ing the task in the fMRI scanner. The relatively high proportion of
false alarms attests of the difficulty in discriminating between self
and other motion in the absence of physical stimulus differences
and based on timing differences alone. Sensitivity measured as d’
was higher in the active than in the passive condition (Figure 4,
upper panel), Wilcoxon t(10) = 2.48, p = 0.01. While it was
different from 0 in the active condition, indicating that subjects
were able to discriminate between self and other’s motion
(d’ = 0.87, Wilcoxon t(10) p,0.01) it was null in the passive
condition, (d’ =20.12, Wilcoxon t(10), p = 0.92). In addition,
subjects showed a self-attribution bias, that is, more readiness to
respond ‘‘self’’ than to respond ‘‘other’’, a bias that tended to be
higher in the active than in the passive condition (c =20.50. vs.
c =20.30, Wilcoxon t(10) = 1.7, p = 0.06, see Figure 4, lower
panel).
fMRI data – Movement attribution to self vs. other
We contrasted trials in which participants subjectively experi-
enced ownership of the viewed hand (‘‘responded self’’ condition)
with trials in which they judged the hand to belong to someone
else (‘‘responded other’’ condition), regardless of which physical
stimulus (self or other) was actually presented. The ‘‘responded
self’’ and ‘‘responded other’’ conditions were identical in terms of
stimuli, motor output and cognitive task, and thus differed only in
the subjective attribution of ownership of the viewed hand. The
results from subject MZ are presented in Figure 5A. The regions
that were significantly more activated in the ‘‘responded self’’ than
in the ‘‘responded other’’ condition were the medial prefrontal
cortex, superior frontal cortex bilaterally, parahippocampal gyrus,
ventral region of the lateral sulcus, inferior parietal cortex and
precuneus, bilaterally.
In order to map the extrinsic and intrinsic systems in the current
study, we contrasted conditions that differed markedly in the
Figure 3. Signal Detection analysis of subjects’ self recognition
performance. Proportion of view-self trials in which subjects correctly
identified their hands (Hits) vs. incorrectly judged them to belong to
someone else (Misses) and proportion of the view-other trials in which
the subjects correctly judged the viewed hands to be someone else’s
(CR - Correct Rejections) vs. incorrectly judged them to be their own (FA
- False Alarms). Note that there were more errors in the passive relative
to the active condition, indicating that the task was more difficult when
subjects were not the authors of the viewed movement.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007527.g003
Figure 4. Signal Detection analysis of behavioural responses
by conditions of movement ownership. Upper panel: Sensitivity
(d’) in the active vs. passive condition. Lower panel: Criterion or
response bias in the active vs. passive condition. Subjects were better at
making the self vs. other discrimination (p,.05) and tended to judge
the viewed hand to be their own in the active relative to the passive
condition (p = .06).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007527.g004
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amount of external demands they involved, namely, all tasks
(active + passive) vs. fixation. The map for subject MZ is shown in
Figure 5B. Regions that were more activated during task blocks
than during fixation blocks include the known regions of the
extrinsic system (low- and high-level visual areas, sensory-motor
regions and premotor regions). Regions that were more deacti-
vated during task blocks than during fixation blocks include the
medial prefrontal and precuneus regions, bilateral superior frontal
cortex, inferior parietal regions and temporal regions.
These maps were used on a subject-by-subject basis to map the
ROIs of the intrinsic system as described in the methods. The
ROIs closely corresponded to the regions identified as belonging
to the intrinsic system in previous studies [29]. Most importantly
and as predicted, there was considerable overlap between the
regions of responded- self vs. responded-other activations and the
selected ROIs of the intrinsic system as shown in Figure 5C. Note
that the other foci of activity, namely, in the parahippocampal
gyrus and medial aspect of the lateral sulcus, also overlapped with
regions found to activate the intrinsic system in the present study.
However, because these regions have not been consistently
associated with the intrinsic system in previous studies, they were
not considered as ROIs here.
Multi-subject data (N= 11) for the mapping of the extrinsic
and intrinsic systems (all tasks vs. fixation) are shown in Figure 6.
Figure 5. Overlap between deactivated regions of the intrinsic system and regions activated by self recognition. Single-subject (MZ)
maps. A. BOLD activations for responded self vs. responded other conditions (self . other). B. BOLD activations for all tasks vs. fixation events (all
tasks . fixation). Regions of the extrinsic system are shown in red-orange, and regions of the intrinsic system in blue-green. C. Overlap between the
regions activated by self recognition (responded self vs. responded other conditions, self . other) and the regions deactivated by the all task vs.
fixation comparison (intrinsic system). CS, central sulcus; SFG, superior frontal gyrus; SFS, superior frontal sulcus; ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; pCgS,
paracingulate sulcus; STS, superior temporal sulcus; IFS, inferior frontal sulcus; IFG, inferior frontal gyrus; IPS, intraparietal sulcus; IPC, inferior parietal
cortex; LS, lateral sulcus; PCUN, precuneus; LOC, lateral occipital complex; LH, left hemisphere; RH, right hemisphere.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007527.g005
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The multi-subject maps were obtained using the partial
conjunction analysis method suggested by Heller [52] and
described in the experimental procedures. Colors represent the
numbers of subjects who showed significant activity in a given
region with FDR level of p,0.05. For each ROI of the intrinsic
system we averaged all subjects’ BOLD signals for this region
separately for the ‘‘responded self’’ and ‘‘responded other’’
conditions.
We then used one-tailed paired student t tests to compare the
two conditions. In line with our predictions, activations in the
ROIs of the intrinsic system showed consistent differences between
the ‘‘responded self’’ and ‘‘responded other’’ conditions. While
these differences were found in both hemispheres, the right
hemisphere showed overall stronger effects. The data for the right
hemisphere is presented here and the left hemisphere data can be
viewed in Supplementary Figure S1.
In order to determine whether movement attribution and type
of motion interacted with each other, we also conducted a 2X2
ANOVA (Self/Other X Active/Passive) for all intrinsic ROIs. The
ANOVA showed no significant interactions between the two
variables in any of the ROIs (all p.0.1). Furthermore the Active/
Passive variable was not significant in any of the intrinsic ROIs (all
p.0.1).
A similar 2X2 ANOVA (Self/Other X Active/Passive) was run
to assess the effects of the experimental conditions in the extrinsic
control regions. The results revealed that none of these regions
showed significant differences between the ‘‘responded self’’- and
‘‘responded other’’-response conditions (all p.0.14). The com-
parison between active and passive motion conditions yielded
significant differences in three regions: Activations were larger in
the active relative to the passive condition in the dorsal medial
prefrontal cortex (F 1,10= 13.323, p= 0.0045), the right superior
intraparietal sulcus (F 1,10= 6.687, p = 0.0271) and the left
superior intraparietal sulcus (F 1,10= 6.393, p = 0.03). No
significant interactions between self- vs. other-response and active
vs passive motion were found (all p.0.05).
Figure 6. Intrinsic ROIs and Self Recognition – Right Hemisphere. A. Folded and inflated views of RH. B. Conjunction map of all tasks vs.
fixation contrast. Multi-subject analysis (N = 11) testing whether at least one contrast activated the region in at least u subjects with FDR ,0.05. The
intensity represents the minimum number of subjects for whom the region was activated, ranging from at least 4 subjects (orange) to 11 subjects
(yellow). Graphs show multi-subject average BOLD activations of ROIs for responded self and responded other conditions. Intrinsic ROIs showed
higher levels of activation in the responded self than in the responded other condition. Error bars represent SEM. ** p,0.01.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007527.g006
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Potential confounds
General arousal. To ensure that the higher levels of activity
observed in the responded-self condition were specific to the
intrinsic system, we sampled eleven control regions from the
extrinsic system corresponding to the regions of highest activation in
the all-task contrast and representing both sensory and motor
systems. These included bilateral occipital cortex, bilateral inferior
occipital cortex, dorsal medial prefrontal cortex, bilateral post
central sulcus, bilateral superior intraparietal sulcus, left post central
gyrus and the superior part of the right lateral sulcus. There was no
differential activity between the ‘‘responded-self’’ and ‘‘responded-
other’’ conditions in these regions of the right (Figure 7) and left (in
Supplementary Figure S2) hemispheres (all p.0.1).
Task difficulty. Previous research has shown that the
intrinsic system is more deactivated and the extrinsic system
more activated in difficult relative to easy externally-oriented tasks
[8,54]. In our task, one might consider the ‘‘responded self’’
condition to have been easier than the ‘‘responded other’’
condition, as subjects showed a significant bias towards
responding ‘‘self’’. Thus, the smaller deactivation of the intrinsic
system observed in the ‘‘self’’ relative to the ‘‘other’’ conditions
might be due to the fact that the former condition was easier than
the latter rather than differences related to self vs. other processing.
However, several factors render this possibility improbable.
In previous work linking task difficulty and modulation of brain
activity in the intrinsic system, the difficulty manipulations
pertained to perceptual processing demands such as stimulus
discrimination or stimulus presentation rate (e.g., [54,55] rather
than to response selection demands. Hence, the more pronounced
deactivation of the intrinsic system was typically accompanied by
higher activation of the extrinsic system, which reflects resource-
demanding processing of external events [34]. In our task, only
response selection requirements differed, as reflected by the
response bias, whereas the perceptual discrimination required by
the task was identical in the ‘‘responded self’’ and ‘‘responded
other’’ conditions. In line with this argument, the activation
pattern of the extrinsic system was no more pronounced in the
responded other than in the responded self conditions.
Figure 7. Extrinsic control regions and Self Recognition – Right Hemisphere. A. Folded and inflated views of RH. B. Conjunction map of all
tasks vs. fixation contrast. Multi-subject analysis (N= 11) testing whether at least one contrast activated the region in at least u subjects with FDR
,0.05. The intensity represents the minimum number of subjects for whom the region was activated, ranging from at least 4 subjects (orange) to 11
subjects (yellow). Graphs show multi-subject average BOLD activations of ROIs for responded self and for responded other conditions. Extrinsic
control regions showed no difference in levels of activation between the responded self and responded other conditions. Error bars represent SEM.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007527.g007
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Direct comparison of the passive and active conditions further
argues against a role for task demands differences in driving the
self vs. other effect. These conditions showed marked differences in
terms of task difficulty, as indicated by the higher performance
accuracy in the active relative to the passive condition (64.10% vs.
47.64%), and by the lower sensitivity (d’ = 0.87 vs. d’ =20.12),
respectively (see Figures 3 and 4). Yet, we observed no differential
activations between the active and passive motion conditions in
the intrinsic system, namely, in the IPC, SFC, Precuneus and
Medial PFC (see Supplementary Figure S3). Furthermore the
ROIs of the intrinsic system showed similar patterns of activation
in the responded self vs. responded other conditions in both the
active and passive conditions (see Figure 8).
Synchronicity. The only information on which subjects
could rely to discriminate between self and other motion were
slight violations of the synchronicity between actual and viewed
movement. In fact, our procedure ensured that the final data set
contained only trials in which these violations were so small that
the experimenter who monitored the differences between the
actual and viewed movement failed to notice them. Thus, the self
vs. other manipulation was confounded with subtle differences in
synchronicity.
Note however that the critical comparison in the present study
concerned brain activity associated with the subjective perception
of the subjects (‘‘responded self’’ vs. ‘‘responded other’’) rather
than with the objective stimulus that they viewed (‘‘view self’’ vs.
‘‘view other’’) and that was the variable confounded with
synchronicity. The subjective perception corresponded to the
objective stimulus only when the subjects responded correctly (i.e.
when the seen and performed movements were synchronized and
the subjects responded ‘‘self’’, and when the movements were not
synchronized and the subjects responded ‘‘other’’), but the two
could be distinguished by taking into account trials in which the
subjects responses were incorrect. Accordingly, in order to address
the possibility that synchronicity rather than perception of self vs.
other accounted for our results, we compared activity in the
intrinsic ROIs in the ‘‘responded-self’’ and ‘‘responded-other’’
conditions when the condition of synchronicity was the same in the
two conditions. That is, we performed separate comparisons for
trials in which the movements were synchronized (the subjects saw
their hands online and either attributed the movement rightly to
themselves or falsely to someone else) and for trials in which the
movements were not synchronized (the subjects’ saw a pre-
recorded movement and either attributed it rightly to someone else
or falsely to themselves). This comparison could be performed only
for the passive condition because there were too few ‘‘miss’’ trials
in the active condition to allow meaningful analysis. Our initial
findings we replicated: the intrinsic ROIs showed higher activity in
the ‘‘responded self’’ condition than in the ‘‘responded other’’
condition both for the view-self condition and for the view-other
condition (see Figure 9). As the behavioral data suggest that
recognition was at chance in the passive condition, these results
show that the differential activation we observed in the ROIs of
the intrinsic system are associated with the subjective attribution of
movement to self since in this analysis all external factors were
precisely matched in terms of movement authorship and
synchronicity.
Furthermore, previous studies in which synchronicity alone was
manipulated, with no embedded self- vs. other distinction, showed
a pattern of brain activations very different from the one observed
here. For instance, in a study by Leube and colleagues [56],
subjects were aware of viewing their own movements throughout
the experiment and determined whether or not a temporal delay
was introduced in the visual feedback of these movements.
Activations were found in the right posterior temporal lobe, which
was not differentially activated by the ‘‘responded-self’’ vs.
‘‘responded-other’’ comparison in the present study and is also
not traditionally associated with the intrinsic system.
fMRI data - Agency
Our behavioral results showed a significant effect of agency on
body ownership decisions, with better accuracy in the active trials.
In an attempt to explore the neural correlates of this effect, we
contrasted active blocks (in which the subjects induced their
right-hand movements with their left hands) with passive blocks
(in which the experimenter pressed the lever moving the subject’s
Figure 9. BOLD activations in the intrinsic ROIs by stimulus
type. BOLD activations in intrinsic ROIs during passive blocks by
response type, separately for synchronized movements -view-self
condition (upper panel) and for unsynchronized movements – view
other condition (lower panel). The subjective attribution of the viewed
movement to self was associated with higher levels of BOLD activation
in the intrinsic ROIs even though all external parameters were identical,
and regardless of movement synchrony. Error bars = SEM.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007527.g009
Figure 8. BOLD activations in the intrinsic ROIs by response
type and movement authorship. Average BOLD activations in the
ROIs for the four cells resulting from crossing the respond self vs.
respond other conditions and the active vs. passive conditions. Note
the similarity of responded self vs. responded other differences in the
active and passive conditions. Error bars = SEM.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007527.g008
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right hand finger). The results are shown in Supplementary
Table S1.
The contrast yielded consistent effects in primary and secondary
sensorimotor regions of the right hemisphere (pre and post central
sulcus regions, p,0.003 uncorrected at the voxel level) and no
significant effect in any of the ROIs of the intrinsic system. No
significant interactions were found between response (self vs. other)
and movement authorship (active vs. passive). Graphs of ROI
activity in the active and passive conditions are presented in
Supplementary Figure S3. The regions of significant activation in
all conditions are presented in Supplementary Table S1.
Discussion
Self-related effects in the intrinsic system
Our findings show that regions of the intrinsic system were more
active during attribution of a viewed movement to self than to
another person (see Figure 6) even when the stimuli and task
requirements pertaining to the ‘‘responded-self’’ and ‘‘responded-
other’’ conditions were precisely identical (Figure 9). It is
noteworthy that regardless of the condition (‘‘responded-self’’ or
‘‘responded-other’’), the signal measured in the intrinsic system
was consistently below the baseline fixation level in the present
study. Given our hypothesis that self-related processing should be
counted among the various functional specializations of the
intrinsic system, it may appear surprising that self attribution did
not produce above baseline activity, but only a smaller level of
deactivation relative to the other attribution. One possible
explanation is that in addition to the self/other attribution, the
present task involved processing video images, executing motor
tasks and providing motor responses, all highly demanding
extrinsic-related tasks that are expected to produce marked
deactivation of the intrinsic system. Indeed, deactivation relative
to ‘‘rest’’ baseline during processing and acting on information
derived from the outside environment has been the most consistent
functional ‘‘signature’’ of the intrinsic system, and has originally
led to its definition as a ‘‘default’’ network (but see [57]). Given the
sluggish nature of the fMRI signal, it is difficult to disentangle the
negative-going extrinsic activation from the positive going self-
related activation, such that the signal observed in the present
study may be interpreted as being the sum of these opposite effects.
The critical point is that the extrinsic aspects of the task were kept
essentially identical while attribution of the viewed hand varied
between ‘‘responded-self’’ and ‘‘responded-other’’ and was thus
uniquely associated with the differential deactivations of the
intrinsic system.
Intrinsic Regions of Interest
Medial Prefrontal regions. Regions that comprise the
midline intrinsic regions, namely, the medial ventral and dorsal
prefrontal cortex and the posterior medial region including the
posterior cingulate and precuneus regions, have been previously
linked to self-related processing [37,58]; [6,9,10]. Most of these
studies used tasks involving emotional, memory or verbal domains
rather than the motor domain [10], and therefore related
predominantly to higher and more conceptual levels of self
processing. In the present study, we investigated the minimal-self
level of representation. The finding that the same regions are
activated by a task from the sensorimotor domain provides strong
converging evidence of task-independent self-related processing in
these regions.
Dorsal Prefrontal regions. Findings from the recent
literature suggest that dorsal prefrontal regions may be part of
the fronto-parietal network associated with internal decisions and
with monitoring for discrepancies between one’s actions and the
sensory outcomes of these actions. This network constitutes a
fundamental aspect of the ‘minimal self’ allowing discrimination of
self from other. Accordingly, the left SFC was found to be more
active in self-determined relative to predetermined finger-tapping
sequences [59] and in tasks involving taking first-person
perspective [24] and introspection [8]. The right SFC has been
associated with self face recognition, mental-state attribution [36]
and ‘Theory of Mind’ tasks, which require self- and other-
perspective taking [23]. Finally, in a PET study by Fink and
colleagues[60], which manipulated the congruency between the
subjects’ intentional movements and their visual sensory outcomes,
the right SFC showed increased response to the conflicting
situation in which intention and outcome did not match. Taken
together, these studies show that the bilateral SFC is involved in
self other judgments based upon movement. This concurs with our
results of higher activity in these regions for the ‘‘responded self’’
condition than for the ‘‘responded other’’ condition.
Inferior Parietal Cortex. The IPC has been recognized as a
prominent area of task-related deactivations [29,32,35]. In the
present study, the IPC regions, especially on the right side, showed
significant activation differences between the responded self and
responded other conditions. This region appears to be involved in
processes of integration between agency and body ownership and
monitoring of discrepancies between intended and observed action
[61–64], and has been recently implicated in voluntary decisions
tasks, particularly in the right hemisphere [65].
Lesion studies have shown that damage to the IPC, especially
on the right side, is associated with misattributions of limb
ownership, with the patient perceiving his or her limb as an alien
object or as belonging to another person [66–71]. Furthermore,
schizophrenia patients who experience delusions of alien control
show hyperactivity of the right IPC compared to patients with no
such delusions [72,73]. In normal subjects, IPC was shown to be
involved in segregation of self from other in the body and
movement domains: the right IPC showed more activity when
participants imagined another person performing an action than
when they imagined themselves acting. The opposite result was
found for the left IPC, where the first-person perspective was
associated with higher activation than the third-person perspective
[43].
Similar activations of the IPC were observed in a task that
required subjects to attribute a viewed motion to self vs. other
based on movement-feedback congruence, which was manipulated
by introducing an angular bias between the subject’s motion and
the corresponding visual feedback. The extent of the discrepancy
between the movement and visual feedback was positively
correlated with activity in the IPC as measured using PET [61].
Similar results were obtained when incongruence was manipulated
in the temporal rather than in the spatial domain using fMRI [62].
Causal relationship between the IPC and self recognition has
been tested using Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS).
rTMS over the right IPL significantly impaired the subjects’
performance in discriminating self faces from other faces [74],
while rTMS over the left IPL impaired detection of asynchrony
between actual and virtual hand movements when these
movements were self generated [75]. Finally, direct cortical
stimulation of the right angular gyrus in an epileptic patient
induced illusionary body transformations and out-of-body expe-
riences [76].
Precuneus. The precuneus is a ‘‘hot spot’’ of resting state
metabolic activity and shows significant task-related deactivations
when engaged in goal directed actions [77]. In the current
experiment we found significant activity differences for the
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responded-self vs. responded-other conditions in this region.
Recent experiments using fMRI and PET have shown this
region to be active in tasks related to visuo-spatial imagery [78,79],
spatial attention [80], episodic memory [81,82] and self-related
processing [24,27,43,63,83,84]. It has been suggested that the
precuneus is involved in several aspects of self processing including
judgment of self-descriptive traits [27,83,84], self-other perspective
taking [23,24,43] and experience of agency [63]. These self-related
functions are in line with the proposed role for the precuneus in
episodic memory and visuo-spatial imagery and attention, as they
may allow us to imagine our and other perspectives as well as
connect our self schema with past knowledge. Furthermore, this
region has been shown to be deactivated during slow wave sleep,
REM sleep, hypnotic sate, general anesthesia and persistent
vegetative state, all states of consciousness associated with an
altered sense of self [77].
Agency
By contrasting between the active and passive blocks, we aimed
at localizing the processes related to agency and in particular, the
neural signals related to self- initiated movement also known as
‘‘efference copy’’. We found localized activity centered around the
right central sulcus and thalamus as well as in the left cerebellum
(see Supplementary Table S1). These activations correspond to the
primary and secondary motor and somatosensory regions of the
contralateral hand performing the action. Thus, they may simply
reflect the motor and somatosensory activations corresponding to
the movement itself. However, they may also be related to
efference copy generation. Several PET studies have contrasted
active and passive movements and reported differential activity in
the contralateral MI, premotor cortex and SMA in the cerebellum
alone [85] or no significant difference at all [86]. These
inconsistencies may be attributed to the low temporal resolution
of PET and fMRI - even using fast event-related designs as we did
- does not allow detection of the transient neural traces involved in
such processes.
Regions outside the intrinsic system
While not the primary focus of this paper, certain regions
outside the intrinsic system showed preferential activation in the
responded self relative to the responded other condition (see
Supplementary Table S1). In particular, the left insula, which
showed such activity in the current study, has also been associated
with self-relevant processing in two previous studies that
contrasted an emotional valence task with a perceptual decision
task [6,87].
Conclusion
The results of the current experiment are compatible with the
notion of a functional division of the brain into two global systems,
one that is oriented towards the external environment and the
other that is tuned inward and deals with processing of self-related
representations. Thus, our awareness appears to alternate between
processing of stimuli impinging upon us from the outside and
updating of our self representations in regard to those stimuli.
Body representation requires that a balance be struck between
these two processes, where the delineation of my body versus
another’s is based upon the sensations rising from external cues.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Intrinsic ROIs and Self Recognition - Left Hemi-
sphere. A. Folded and inflated views of LH. B. Conjunction map
of all tasks vs. fixation contrast. Multi-subject analysis (N= 11)
testing whether at least one contrast activated the region in at least
u subjects with FDR ,0.05. The intensity represents the
minimum number of subjects for whom the region was activated
ranging from at least 4 subjects (orange) to 11 subjects (yellow).
Graphs show multi-subject average BOLD activations of ROIs for
responded self and responded other conditions. Intrinsic ROIs
showed higher levels of activation in the responded self than in the
responded other condition. Error bars represent SEM. * p,0.05
** p,0.01
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007527.s001 (10.19 MB
TIF)
Figure S2 Extrinsic control regions and Self Recognition - Left
Hemisphere. A. Folded and inflated views of LH. B. Conjunction
map of all tasks vs. fixation contrast. Multi-subject analysis
(N= 11) testing whether at least one contrast activated the region
in at least u subjects with FDR ,0.05. The intensity represents the
minimum number of subjects for whom the region was activated,
ranging from at least 4 subjects (orange) to 11 subjects (yellow).
Graphs show multi-subject average BOLD activations of ROIs for
responded self and for responded other conditions. Extrinsic
control regions showed no difference in levels of activation
between the responded self and responded other conditions. Error
bars represent SEM. * p,0.05 ** p,0.01
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007527.s002 (10.19 MB
TIF)
Figure S3 BOLD activations in the Intrinsic ROIs by movement
authorship. Average BOLD activations in the ROIs show no
differences between the Active and Passive conditions. Error
bars = SEM.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007527.s003 (0.24 MB TIF)
Table S1 Regions of significant activity by condition. Agency
(Active . Passive). Minimum cluster size 50 voxels. p,0.005
uncorrected for multiple comparisons at the voxel. All tasks
((Active+Passive), Rest). Minimum cluster size 800 voxels.
p,0.005 corrected for multiple comparisons. Self Recognition
(Hits + False Alarms) ,(Correct Rejections + Misses). Minimum
cluster size 100 voxels. p,0.015 uncorrected for multiple
comparisons at the voxel.
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0007527.s004 (0.08 MB
DOC)
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